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The younc Mitterand on the court 
Paris: Game, 
Set and Match 
T he ease with which Francois Mitterrand was re-elected as president of the Sth Republic, 
and the consequent formation of the 
Rocard government, signal a major 
realignment in French politics. 
Dunng hi~ 11rst seven-year term 
as president, M itterrand and the 
Socialist Party have been able to 
redefine a substantial section of the 
traditional left electorate into a more 
centrist pos1t1on. Although the new 
centre-left government of Rocard is 
the end result of this redefinition, it 
b. in fact. only the conclusion of a 
strategy which has its origins in the 
early '70s. 
Shortly aftcrthe signing. in June 
1972. of the Common Programme 
a tactical but brittle electoral alliance 
between the Communi~t and 
Socialist Parties both Communist 
leader Marchais and Mitterrand 
pnvatel) expressed to their 
respective constituents their own 
strategic view of the document. 
While acknowledging that it 
represented the first tentative step 
back towards government for the 
Communist Party [PCF] (resulting 
some nine years later in four minor 
mm1stncs 1n the first Socialist 
government). Marchais urged his 
party "to safeguard its true position 
and warned against the reformist 
social democratic nature of the 
Socialist Party". Mitterrand, 
somewhat less ideological but more 
prophetic, as the recent elections 
have borne out, assured a meeting of 
the Socialist International Executive 
Committee that with the Programme 
"our basic objective is to build a great 
Socialist party on the terrain 
occupied by the Communist Party 
itself and thus to show that of five 
million communist voters, three 
million can be brought to vote 
socialist". 
The success of Mitterrand's 
strategy and the decline of 
communist electoral support has 
been evident in most local and 
national elections over the past seven 
years. The first round of the recent 
presidential elections confirmed this. 
Against a combined commumst vote 
of 8.9 percent (6.9 percent for the 
PCF and two percent for the 
breakaway Renovateurs), Mitt-
errand received 34.1 percent. 
The significance of this electoral 
shift lies beyond the simple loss of 
communist support to the socialists. 
Rather, it marks a subtle but 
fundamental change in the landscape 
of French politics, where political 
position<; have tradttlonally been 
defined clearly in terms of a strict 
right left dichotomy. Any past 
variation in this scheme has been to 
diverge further either to the right or 
left. M1tterrand, however. 
campaigning on a platform devoid of 
any reference to socialist aims and 
stressing the virtues of a "Unified 
France", has been able to finally 
break this right left division and 
secure under the Prime Ministership 
of Michel Rocard a left-centre 
government. 
The presence of this new centrist 
formation seems assured following 
discussions with moderates in the 
centre-right which resulted in the 
guarantee of a number of centrist 
ministers in the next Rocard 
government should the socialists be 
successful in the forthcoming general 
elections. 
Ironically, the move towards the 
centre has been facilitated by the very 
nature of the 5th Republic's 
constitution, originally drawn up 
specifically to satisfy the demands of 
de Gaulle. Cohabitation is 
theoretically poss1ble within the 
framework of the constitution, but a 
possibility which was never expected 
to eventuate. That it has eventuated 
and been a relatively stable form of 
government during the past two 
years, has also helped fracture the 
traditional left/ right opposition. 
Not all the centrist moves, 
however, have come from the left. As 
far back as his defeat in the 
presidential elections by Mitterrand 
in 1981, Giscard d'Estaing has urged 
the UDF to try to occupy the centre. 
But. in the event, it has been the 
Socialists trumping the UDF, and 
the failure of any communist 
response which has provided the 
framework for French politics for at 
least the next decade. 
This is not to ignore the presence 
and continued support for Le Pen 
and his National Front on the 
extreme right. For, while the NF has 
only emerged electorally since the 
early '80s. it does represent a 
consistent rightwing tradition in 
French society - a tradition which 
had its clearest expression in the 
collaborationist Vichy government 
during World War II. but which can 
be traced back as far as the Dreyfus 
affair late last century. 
While the long-term existence of 
th1s racist element needs to be 
recognised, its influence overall will 
stay small providing it remains 
isolated and is not permitted to enter 
into electoral deals with other 
sections of the right. namely Chirac 
and his rightwing RPR. At present it 
appears that, although Le Pen's 
politics is able to appeal to a fair 
proportion of the electorate ( 14.4 
percent in the first round of the 
presidential elections), its very 
strength also acts as a sufficient 
deterrent to any alliance with the 
more moderate rightwing forces and 
thereby ensures its own isolation. 
Furthermore. the developments 
proposed for 1992 by the European 
Commission (under which Western 
Europe will become more integrated 
economically with a common 
financial market and one European 
domestic market instead of 12 
national markets) should reduce 
some of the economic conditions 
which provide Le Pen with his 
present political base. Moreover. 
there is something contradictory 
between the racist nationalism of the 
National Front and the gradual 
emergence of a sort of European 
supra-state, of which the 1992 
reforms are but a part. 
Although still in an embryonic 
form, a trans-European state will add 
to the predicament facing what 
remains of the politics to the left of 
the Socialist Party. With the PCF 
and other sections of the left the 
Ecologists, for example - there is at 
least the rhetoric of internationalism. 
However, the likelihood of any 
effective substa nee being given to this 
internationalism in a way that would 
make it combative with the 
development of an integrated 
capitalist Europe appears quite 
remote - - though this would seem to 
be the direction left and progressive 
movements in France and Europe 
should go. 
At a national level. the PCF 
faces. along with the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI), the 
dilemma of being a mass party in a 
developed capitalist democracy. It 
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does have the distinction of having 
twice been in government, though 
both these experiences have done 
little but underline the difficulties of 
being the minor partner in a coalition 
with the Socialists (as in 1981-84), or 
highlight (as in 1947 J the external 
opposition which can be mounted on 
the left when part of the conditions 
for receiving Marshall Plan aid was 
the expulsion of the communists 
from the government. 
The task facing the French left, 
and particularly the PCF, is more 
pressing than at any;ime since World 
War II. It has effectively lost the 
strategic struggle with Mitterrand 
and the PS now faces a new level of 
supra-state capitalist development. 
The only possible hint of 
optimism comes from the political 
space opened up on the left by 
Mitterrand's successful centrist move 
- though it seems doubtful that the 
PCF, Renovateurs, or the 
Ecologists, can reoccupy this 
traditional left space in any 
convincing manner. Their failure to 
do so will only magnify the strategic 
success Mitterrand has achieved 
since the days of the Common 
Programme. 
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